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I. ST A TEMENT 
Employer/Surety is correct identifying that standard set out in Idaho 
Code § 72-451 for psychological injuries is a more rigorous standard than is outlined by Idaho 
Code title 72 for physical industrial injuries. The Legislature set out a different causation 
standard in Idaho Code §72-451 for psychological injuries than physical injuries. When 
addressing a physical injury a Claimant must show that the "injury she claims benefits for is 
causally related to an accident occmTing in the course of employment." Shubert v. Macy's West 
_Idaho_ (2015), 343 P.3d 1099, 1107, citing Hart v. Kaman Bearing Supply, 130 Idaho 
296,939 P.2d 1375 (1997). l.C. § 72-451 requires that the Claimant show that the "accident and 
injury must be the predominant cause as compared to all causes." Under the workers 
compensation system a Claimant must show with physical injuries simply a causal relationship 
between the accident and the injury, while with psychological injuries the Claimant must show 
that the accident and/or related physical injury is the predominate cause of the psychological 
mJury. 
This predominant cause standard has been interpreted as requiring the industrial injury 
and accident to be at least 51 % of the cause of the psychological condition. Benner vs. Home 
Depot, Inc., 2013 IIC 0002.21 ,i 92. The Commission and the testimony offered has focused on 
the effect of the industrial chronic pain injury on the Claimant's psychological wellbeing, but 
I.C. § 72-451 (3) is not so limiting as it requires that the examination of whether "such accident 
and injury" is the predominant cause. In the workers compensation system the tenns "accident" 
and "injury" have distinct definitions given meaning by the Idaho Legislature. l.C. 72-
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, Page 1 
18)(a)-(c). The though imposing a higher standard than in 
claims, still sought a holistic causation evaluation, not one narrmvly focused on 
one element. Though the issue in this case is narrow, adopting a narrow focus limited to just the 
evaluation of expert opinions, without addressing the factually relevant context that those 
opinions were offered in, is error. 
II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
Claimant laid out in his briefing before the Commission that this case is one that turns on 
the support and interpretation of expert testimony. Employer/Surety wishes to present this 
matter as one of strictly the evaluation of "expert testimony" to the exclusion of the other 
evidence in the record, that is inconsistent with the Court's recommendation. The Court has 
directed that evaluation of evidence, especially credibility of witnesses and opinions is to be 
based upon "substantial consistency supported by other evidence in the record." Clark v. Shari's 
Management C01p, 155 Idaho 576, 581, 314 P.3d 632, 637 (2013). Evaluation of the credibility 
of evidence is not something to be compartmentalized. Such detenninations are to be based 
upon the totality of the evidence in the record. This is a standard that the Commission has 
routinely used in past cases. Melugin v. Ag Express, Inc., 2014 IIC 0032.10; Brennen v. 
Selkirk Press, Inc., 2012 IIC 0009.18; Henry v. Department of Corrections 2011 IIC 0045.18; 
Tim Miller v. Adecco 2009 IIC 0097.8; Resindez v. Challenger Pallet, 2005 IIC 0246.8. Where 
the totality of the evidence demonstrates that the Commission's findings and conclusions, 
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on credibility, were clearly erroneous, such findings are to be reversed as were not 
made on the basis of and 
Employer/Surety assc1is that Claimant is asking the Comi to "second guess" the 
Industrial Commission's weighing of Dr. Calhoun's testimony, and cites Lorca-Merono v. Yokes 
Washington Foods, Inc, 137 Idaho 446, 455, 50 P.3d 461, 470 (2002) for the proposition that 
such "second guessing" should be expressly rejected. Employer/Surety misstates the standard 
outlined in Lorca-Merono when evaluating a Commission's findings regarding expert opinions. 
In Lorca-Merono the Referee authored an opinion placing weight on one set of physicians (Drs. 
Kody, Watkins and Hahn). The Commission did not choose to adopt the opinion authored by the 
Referee and instead authored its own opinion placing weight instead on Dr. Lindem's opinion. 
The dispute on appeal was whether the Commission itself had authority to disregard the 
Referee's unadopted findings. The Court held that the Commission had authority to adopt its 
own findings and weigh credibility. The Court set out the standard for its evaluation of the 
Commission's decision as follows: 
The findings of fact made by the referee were merely recommendations to the 
Industrial Commission. Upon reviewing those findings it could either adopt them 
or enter its own findings. The Commission need not explain why it did not adopt 
certain findings recommended by the referee. The Industrial Commission, as the 
fact finder, is free to detennine the weight to be given to the testimony of a 
medical expert. The Commission is not bound to accept the opinion of a treating 
physician over that of a physician who merely examined the claimant for the 
pending litigation. We will not disturb the Commission's conclusion as to the 
weight and credibility of expert testimony unless such conclusions are clearly 
erroneous. Lorca-Merono, at 451. (Citations omitted). 
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The standard which the Court set out is not one which never re-evaluates expe1i 
testimonial evidence, but instead evaluates it whether it \:ms "clearly erroneous" to rely upon 
such evidence. The Court has further clarified when evaluating witnesses before a non-jury 
tribunal that 
"in detennining whether a finding is clearly erroneous this Court does not weigh 
the evidence as the district corni did. The corni inquires whether the findings of 
fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence. This Court will not 
substitute its view of the facts for the view of the district judge. Evidence is 
regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it 
in detennining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven." Shawver v. 
Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004). 
( Citations omitted). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also explained the clearly erroneous standard. "A finding is 
'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the 
entire evidence is left with the definite and finn conviction that a mistake has been committed." 
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). The law allows the Court to 
reexamine the evidence before the Commission including testimonial evidence. Such an 
examination is to detennine whether "a mistake has been committed" or whether the decision 
reached was one which a reasonable trier of fact could not arrive at. This examination is based 
on the "entire evidence." If the Court detennines that a mistake has been committed, the finding 
should be reversed, even as to the weight given to a witnesses' testimony. 
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A. The Industrial Commission's Wholesale Reliance upon Dr. Calhoun's 50/50 
Analvsis was Clearly Erroneous Based on the Totalitv of the Evidence, Including 
Evidence the Commission Found Undisputed and Persuasive, and is Therefore not 
Based on Substantial and Competent Evidence. 
The trier of fact is required to examine all of the evidence when evaluating credibility. 
Employer/Surety seeks to take Claimant's Counsel's own words out of context regarding the 
proper evaluation of the Claimant's pre-existing psychological condition. (Employer/Surety's 
Responsive Brief, p. 24-25). As outlined in Claimant's Counsel's brief, and outlined above, 
proper evaluation of Claimant's pre-existing psychological condition, requires an examination of 
the "entire evidence," not just one medical opinion. Additionally, proper evaluation of that 
medical opinion, Dr. Calhoun's, requires an examination of the "entire evidence." 
Dr. Calhoun's opinion alone demonstrates that the Industrial accident and related injuries 
are the predominate cause of Claimant's psychologic condition. The Commission's analysis of 
Dr. Calhoun's opinion is erroneous, as based on the totality of the evidence it is logically 
unsound. The Commission rejected Claimant's argument that Claimant's depression is caused 
50% by the Claimant's chronic pain condition due the industrial accident and at least 1 % caused 
by Claimant's anger, hostility, resentfulness and dysthymia, resulting in the Industrial accident 
and injury being the predominant cause of the Claimant's depression. The Commission rejected 
this argument because it supposed it would require the rejection of Dr. Calhoun's opinion, which 
it thought well-founded. The Commission also stated it rejected such an ar.!:,rtllnent because Dr. 
Calhoun specifically rejected such an interpretation of his opinion. (Findings, p. 12). Claimant's 
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does not reqmre a rejection of Calhoun's op11110n; rather it calls for it to be 
interpreted in light of the entire of the Additionally, Dr. Calhoun did not 
specifically "reject" this interpretation of his opinion; he instead relied upon circular logic to 
conclude that the Claimant "was given the opportunity to be treated" for any such personality 
changes due to the accident and/or injury had received treatment, though the Dr. Calhoun at the 
same time stated that such treatment was ineffective because of the Claimant's mistrust and 
hostility. (Calhoun Depo., pp. 27-28, II. 24-11 ). 
Dr. Calhoun opined that 50% of the Claimant's psychological condition was due to the 
industrial injury. He then stated that the other 50% was due to the Claimant's "personality 
traits." (Claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 63). In his report Dr. Calhoun does not specify the source of 
these "personality traits," only following in Consideration/Recommendation 2 of that report does 
Dr. Calhoun opine, making a legal detennination not a medical one, that "thus" the June 13, 
2008 injury is not the predominate cause of the Claimant's current depression. Id. In his post 
hearing deposition testimony Dr. Calhoun opined that the Claimant's "mistrust and cynicism, 
hostility and dysthymia," were a "preexisting pattern." (Calhoun Depo., p. 28, 11. 10-11 ). 
Dr. Calhoun's opinion places two categories of cause to the Claimant's current 
psychological depressive condition: (1) "Mr Gerdon's industrial accident and subsequent pain 
disorder" and (2) "Mr. Gerdon's personality traits." (Claimant Exhibit 2, p. 63). Each exactly 
equally weighted as the cause of the Claimant's current depressive disorder on a 50/50 basis. 
Claimant outlined to the Commission and to this Court in his Appellant's Brief that 
apportioning all of Claimant's personality traits as being a pre-existing cause of the Claimant's 
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depression is inconsistent not only with the record in its entirety but with the Commission's own 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Employer/Surety asserts that such a reading of the 
record is taking one portion of Dr. Calhoun's testimony out of context. The portion of Dr. 
Calhoun's deposition transcript frequently cited by Claimant in his brief is simply the most 
obvious example of the error committed. Other portions of the record also lead to the same 
conclusion, including other portions of Dr. Calhoun's testimony. 
When discussing the Claimant's evaluation for the WorkSTAR program Dr. Calhoun 
explained: 
A: Yes. I would just say that while he was in the WorkSTAR program, we 
were starting to look at his frustration in reaction to pain, his fear of pain and 
movement. We were also trying to get him to come off some of his pain 
medications, which was very overwhelming for him. We also addressed his 
tendency to anticipate the future anxiously and cynically, and then again, bringing 
that back on how that can exacerbate his pain. 
I would say those were the primary issues. And then trying to get him to 
move away from anger, as far as being such a readily available and frequent 
emotion for him. 
Q: So what causes a person to have these types of issues that Mr. Gerdon 
was exhibiting? 
A: Well, you know some of it certainly was related to the pain itself that 
he was going through, but also he had, certainly, a preexisting propensity toward 
being hostile or cynical or mistrustful of others. 
Q: How do we know that from a clinical sense? 
A: Well that was based on the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory-2 
and then also just in his presentation. That his anger often seemed to be out of 
proportion of what was going on at the moment. And his mistrust for what the 
doctors were trying to move him, he just really got angry about that and reacted 
very strongly. (Calhoun Depo., p. 12-13, ll. 5-7). [Emphasis added]. 
Some important elements exist 111 this exchange. First, the definitiveness of Dr. Calhoun's 
statement about this pre-existing propensity toward hostility, cynicism and mistrust of others is 
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important. "Certainly. is an echo of Dr. Calhoun's statement that he was 
those around Mr. Gerdon would be able to observe the Claimant's hostility and 
resentfulness. (Calhoun Depo., p. 33, 11. 20-23). As pointed out to the Commission and to the 
Court in the prior briefing, those who knew Mr. Gerdon prior to his industrial injury not only did 
not observe such actions, they observed the exact opposite personality. (Tr. p. 43, IL 13-17; p. 44 
lL 1-2; p. 57, IL 1-6; p. 5811. 5-6, 12-13). 
Second, this opinion was based on testing taken after the industrial injury as well as based 
on "presentation" which occurred after the industrial injury. Dr. Calhoun is observing a subject, 
the Claimant, after the event, and drawing conclusions about the state of the subject's condition 
prior to the event by stating that what he observed existed before the event The logical analysis 
of such thought requires the following proposition that Mr. Gerdon presents this way now in 
testing and observation, so he must have presented this way before the industrial injury. Such a 
logical analysis is self-creating, and therefore leads to the exclusion of evidence that does not fit 
within that circle of reasoning. Dr. Calhoun exhibits this same circular logic throughout his 
testimony. 
Q: Why do you do these types of tests? I mean, you've done these twice 
on Mr. Gerdon. Why? 
A: Well again to look at what the objective tests generate in terms of 
personality makeup, coping skills, and then look for patterns over time. 
And what concerns me with Mr. Gerdon is the chronicity of these pattersn, 
these psychological patterns. 
Q: What do the patterns tell you? 
A. Just that they likely preexisted his injury. That he was one who was a 
hostile individual prior to his injury, had anger issues, was certainly prone to 
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depression, and that just seemed to over through many evaluations over the 
years. Calhoun Depo., p. 11. I 0-23 
This selection agam emphasizes the Dr. Calhoun's certainty about the observability of the 
Claimant's mental condition prior to the industrial injury, in this selection that the Claimant was 
"certainly prone to depression" prior to the industrial injury. Id. This is in direct opposition to 
actual observation of the Claimant prior to the industrial injury. Cody Campbell testified that 
prior to the industrial injury the Claimant "was optimistic. The most optimist guy I have ever 
met, actually. Just always trying to talk reason into you and show you the good side of 
everything." (Tr., p. 48-49, 11. 24-2). This is not someone who was "certainly prone to 
depression." Dr. Calhoun testified that testing and frequent evaluations were important to look 
for "patterns over time." The problem with the observations made by Dr. Calhoun was that all of 
the observations were made after the industrial injury. Dr. Calhoun looked at a re-occurring 
pattern after an event, the industrial injury, and drew a conclusion about what should exist prior 
to that event, a continuation of that pattern. However, the evidence in the record, which the 
Commission found was unrebutted and persuasive, shows that the pattern Dr. Calhoun expected 
to see did not exist. The pattern had insufficient evidence to reach the conclusion that Dr. 
Calhoun sought to reach. 
Dr. Calhoun addressed this possibility in the passage following the one cited above, but 
did so referring back again to circular reasoning. 
Q: I mean, is it possible for these tests to be indicating something that was 
created by his industrial accident? 
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Well I think they could certainly, the industrial accident could 
have exacerbated some of these ... (Calhoun Depo., pp. 27-28, 11. 24-4). 
Here Dr. Calhoun acknowledges that the industrial accident "certainly" could have caused an 
impact, an aggravation or worsening of the Claimant's personality traits of anger and hostility. 
In the continuing portion of the passage of testimony Dr. Calhoun enters circular reasoning to 
minimize such a conclusion. 
A: but I think he was given the opportunity to be treated for these things 
that were related to the industrial injury, but he just couldn't trust enough to 
respond. He couldn't believe in his medical team, his psychological treatment, 
enough to respond. 
Q: And what do you relate that to? 
A: Just those preexisting patterns of mistrust and cynicism, hostility and 
dysthymia. (Calhoun Depo., pp. 28, 11 4-11 ). 
Dr. Calhoun acknowledges that the industrial accident could change a Claimant's personality. 
However he asserts that such changes were not at play in the current case because the Claimant 
got treatment for his industrial injury, but at the same time states the treatment was in effectual 
because he had a pattern of mistrust, cynicism and hostility, the very conditions which he 
acknowledge could have been exacerbated by the industrial injury, but weren't because he got 
treatment, which treatment was ineffectual. Dr. Calhoun's logic follows a circular pattern 
because it is based on an incomplete pattern, a pattern which only considered evidence observed 
after the industrial injury. Such a logic construction is erroneous, and reached an erroneous 
conclusion, that Claimant's personality traits or anger and hostility pre-existed the industrial 
injury. This conclusion is wrong, and can be tested by looking at Dr. Calhoun's pattern. Dr. 
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analysis is that he observed a pattern of anger hostility after the industrial 
injury, so that must existed prior to the industrial injury. By examining whether that pattern 
existed prior to the industrial injury, one can test Dr. Calhoun's conclusion whether the 
Claimant's personality traits of anger and hostility preexisted the industrial injury and accident. 
The Commission found that there was no pre-existing psychological treatment notes to 
compare with. This leaves the only evidence in the record of the Claimant's psychological 
condition prior to the industrial injury as the observational testimony of Mickey and Racheal 
Gerdon, and Jesse and Cody Campbell. Claimant's counsel has outlined and drawn comparisons 
of this testimony in both Claimant's briefing before the Commission and in Claimant's initial 
brief before this Court. It is sufficient at this juncture to state that the Commission found "their 
testimony regarding the change in Claimant's personality following his industrial accident [as] 
undisputed and persuasive." (Findings, p. 6). [Emphasis added]. 
To accept the testimonies of the Campbell's and Gerdon's as undisputed and persuasive 
and at the same time to accept the pattern laid out by Dr. Calhoun is a logical impossibility 
because Dr. Calhoun's interpretation of his pattern requires the existence of "certain" and "sure" 
anger, hostility, mistrust, cynicism and depression observable by those around him prior to the 
industrial injury. The undisputed testimony is that no such matters were observed, and instead 
what was observed was "the most optimistic guy I have ever met." Concluding that Claimant's 
personality traits of anger and hostility, 50% of the cause of his current depression, pre-existed 
the industrial accident is wrong, it is clearly erroneous. The conclusion that fits the evidence is 
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the one Dr. Calhoun rejected because it didn't fit his faulty pattern, "the industrial accident could 
exacerbated some these." (Calhoun Dcpo., p. 28, 11. 3-4). 
Claimant agrees with Defendant that 50% of the depression is caused by the pain disorder 
and 50% is caused by the Claimant's personality traits. However Claimant asserted below to the 
Commission and to this Court that the totality of the evidence demonstrates that some portion of 
Claimant's personality traits of anger, hostility, resentfulness and dysthymia are due to the 
industrial accident and industrial injury. This means that the Industrial accident and industrial 
injury are the predominant cause of the Claimant's current depressive symptoms, and that the 
Commission erred by not appropriately considering the totality of the evidence, and therefore 
reached a conclusion not based on substantial and competent evidence. 
B. Dr. Marsh's Testimony and Records Support the Conclusion that the 
Predominant Cause of the Claimant's Depression is the Industrial Accident and 
Injurv 
As stated repeatedly, the Claimant does bear the burden of proving the industrial accident 
and injury were the predominant cause of the Claimant's psychological condition. However, the 
Court has also held that "Magic words" are not necessary in addressing causation. Only that 
"plain and unequivocal testimony conveying a conviction" of causation is offered." Jensen v. 
City of Pocatello, 135 Idaho 406, 412-13, 18 P.3d 211,217 (2001). While the burden of proof 
might be different regarding J.C. § 72-451 injuries, the eviclentiary standard for what evidence 
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should be considered is not. Dr. Marsh expressed a clear unequivocal opinion regarding the 
cause of the Claimant's current depression. 
The Commission found Dr. Marsh's opinion "credible" but limited due to "its narrow 
foundation." (Findings, p. 11 ). Defendants argue that because Dr. Marsh did not use the correct 
wording in his opinion the opinion is of little value. The Court has always held that it is the 
substance and basis of the opinion which is important, not wording. 
No psychological treatment or testing exists establishing the Claimant's psychological 
status prior to his 2008 industrial motor vehicle accident. This means when reaching a 
conclusion regarding causation we must rely upon non-medical evidence that existed at the time, 
or try and draw conclusions from medical evidence created after the industrial accident and 
injury. The analysis above shows the danger of relying exclusively on medical evidence created 
after the industrial accident and injury: conclusions drawn from that evidence are inaccurate 
when they cannot be correlated with evidence preexisting the accident and injury. 
Dr. Marsh states that [he] "spend[ s] an inordinate amount of time asking historical 
questions regarding people's pain and whatnot." (Marsh Depo., p. 8, 11. 14-16.) He also states 
that it is "very" important to get histories from "folks other than the patients, such as family 
members." (Marsh Depo.m p. 8, 11. 18-20). He reaffinned this particularly with psychological 
concerns. 
[l]ts important, especially when you're talking about people's psychological 
status and behavior, because a lot of times people aren't sensitive to their own 
you know, to how others are perceiving them and, you know how their actions are 
affecting other people, and so they're just it helps to have an outside opinion. 
(Marsh Depo., p. 9, 11. 8-14). 
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Marsh treated the Claimant regularly since January 19, 2011 (Marsh Depo., p. 6, 11. 1 18). 
Dr. Marsh spoke \vith the Claimant's mother and the Claimant about the Claimant's 
psychological state regarding both his condition at the time of the examination, as well as prior 
to the industrial accident and injury. (Marsh Depo., p. 23-26, 11. 18-7). 
You take people they way they come, right? I mean, I'm sure he's -- I did ask 
him about this at some point, and you, I asked if he' cl ever had depression, and 
you know, what he acted like when he was a kid, and there's no indication, in my 
mind, that he had a preexisting depressive disorder. So taking somebody like that 
and then putting them through what he's been through, I think it's only logical 
that his cunent psychological states is directly related to his chronic pain. (Marsh 
Depo., p. 28, 11. 
Both the Commission and the Employer/Surety latched on to the language Dr. Marsh used "you 
take people they way they come" for the proposition that Dr. Marsh's opinion was insufficient 
regarding a predominant cause standard. Findings, p. 12). The Commission in prior proceedings 
addressing l.C. § 72-451 acknowledged that the Commission was still required to evaluate the 
injured worker "as he is" when perfonning the predominant cause evaluation. Quinn v. Doug's 
Fireplace Sales, Inc. 2014 IIC 0095.22 citing Smith v. Garland Construction Services, 2009 
IIC 0179.8. This court affinned in In Warreu v. Williams & Parson PC CPAS, 157 Idaho 528, 
337, P.3d 1257 (2014) that an employer/surety takes the employee "as he is, in cletennining the 
predominant cause of a psychological condition." 
Based on Dr. Marsh's regular treatment of the Claimant, the histories obtained, and his 
professional experience, Dr. Marsh's is of the clear and unequivocal opinion that the industrial 
accident and injury were the cause of the Claimant's current depression, and that Claimant did 
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not a pre-existing depressive disorder. 1s consistent the "undisputed and 
persuasive" those obser-:ed the Claimant prior to the industrial accident and 
mJury. 
Finding Dr. Marsh's opinion was narrow in foundation and inapplicable because it did 
not use specific "magic words" is in error and not based on the evidence in the record. 
C. The Court has Sufficient Evidence to Decide the Matter 
Remand is not necessary as the evidence of the Claimant's pre-existing mental status is 
clear based on the testimony and evidence in the record. It was clear enough that the 
Commission found it "undisputed and persuasive." (Findings, p. 6). Where such factual 
evidence is undisputed it should direct the findings of causation. 
Should the Court detem1ine to so find, it is important to also address, as Claimant 
presented to the Commission, that LC. § 72-451(5)'s diagnosis requirement is specific to issues 
of impairment and disability. In the present case, the parties were very specific to limit the 
matter before the Commission as one of medical treatment. (Tr., p. 7-8, 11. 6-10.). Following the 
rules of statutory interpretation the plain meaning of the wording of the statute is to be given 
meaning. Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Valley County, 132 Idaho 
551,557,976 P.2d 477,483 (1999). The Supreme Court has also routinely stated that "the tenns 
of Idaho's worker's compensation statue are liberally construed in favor of the employee." 
Haldiman v. Am. Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956-57, 793 P.2d 187 (1990). This all means that 
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1(5)'s limitations are applicable in those cases where 
pcnnancnt impairment and permanent disability. This is especially true 
Claimant is seeking 
the matters of 
impainnent were already before the Commission in a prior proceeding and decided. 
The Court has sufficient evidence before it to decide the compensability of Mr. 
Gerdon's psychological treatment, recommended by both Dr. Calhoun and Dr. Marsh. 
D. Matters not Raised by the Parties are not to be Considered 
The Court has been unequivocal in ruling that "when reviewing the decision of the 
Commission, this Court is 'limited to the evidence, theories and arguments' that were presented 
to the Commission below ... Consequently, we 'will not consider ar6,1.nnents raised for the first 
time on appeal."' Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing, 157 Idaho 309,315,336 P.3d 242 (2014) 
( quotations original) ( citations omitted). As in this case, the Court has had occasion to reaffinn 
that when a surety fails to raise an argument before the Commission, "It is well established that 
arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be heard." Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 
Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d 572 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Before the Industrial Commission the Employer/Surety did not argue or raise any issue or 
claim preclusion. "Defendants have not raised claim or issue preclusion as a defense to this 
claim for psychological treatment. Therefore this issue will not be addressed." Findings p., 7., 
citing Deon v. H&J Inc., 157 Idaho 665, 339 P.3d 550 (2014). As the Court laid out in Deon to 
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so sua would be in err. Additionally it would be in applicable as the evidence and 
testimony demonstrate that the Claimant is seeking for treatment \Vhieh arose, while due to the 
industrial injury, since the last hearing on this matter. (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 33). 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
The Commission committed error by not relying upon the whole record, especially those 
elements it found to be "undisputed and persuasive" in reaching its conclusion. By doing so the 
Commission reached a conclusion which was not supported by substantial and competent 
evidence, and is clearly erroneous. As it is clearly erroneous the matter should be reversed and 
the Court should find compensable the treatment sought by the Claimant. 
DATED this __ day of November, 2015. 
GOICOECHEA LAW 
Attorneys for Claimant/ Appellant 
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